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Introduction
2011 is a crucial year for the future of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU). A new reform is being prepared. Past reforms of the CAP have been extensively studied and analyzed. A key issue in the current discussions is the impact of changes in the EU decision-making structure. The Treaty of Lisbon (2007) changed the rules under which agricultural policy is set in the EU. Specifically, it altered the influence of the European Parliament (EP) on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in two important ways:
it expanded the EP"s role in the budgetary process; and it modified the legislative procedure that applies to the CAP, introducing co-decision to replace consultation. 1 In this paper we focus on the latter modification.
Co-decision was first introduced in 1992 in a number of policy areas other than the CAP. To this date this move represents the most important step in the EP"s process of legislative empowerment. Co-decision formally recognizes the parity between the Council and the EP as legislative bodies, granting the latter a continued involvement in the legislative process. This is an important difference with the consultation procedure, in which EP intervention is only consultative in a specific and defined stage of the procedure. The application of co-decision to the CAP may have important effects on the possibility of CAP reforms. In earlier CAP reforms political and institutional changes also played an important role (Swinnen, 2008) .
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the implications of the adoption of codecision for future CAP reform. Several studies have evaluated the increasing influence of the EP on EU policy outcomes. Some provide a descriptive account of this increasing influence.
They consider how treaty modifications have affected the distribution of powers among EU institutions, and then explain how the EP has been able to exploit its new powers to increase its impact on legislation (Shackleton, 2000 , Corbett et. al, 2003 , Maurer, 2003 . Others approach the problem analytically. For example, they consider the number of amendments successfully proposed by the EP under different procedures as a measure of its legislative power Judge 1993, 1997; Judge and Earnshaw, 1994; Moser, 1996 , Kreppel, 1999 . However, none of these studies focus on the role of the EP in the CAP.
An empirical study of the EP"s influence on the CAP and the likelihood of CAP reform under co-decision requires a large database on different issues involved in the CAP and the way they have been settled under consultation and co-decision. Since co-decision has only been applied to the CAP since December 2009, we cannot compare the numbers of successful EP amendments on the CAP under consultation and co-decision to evaluate the EP"s powers under co-decision and the likelihood of CAP reform. At this point there is merely some anecdotal evidence that the EP is behaving differently under co-decision, moving away from position-taking and toward responsible policy-making, and acquiring more influence in the process.
For these reasons we use a theoretical approach based on spatial models. Such models explain policy outcomes as a function of the legislative procedures, the preferences of the political actors and the location of the status quo (Steunenberg, 1994; Tsebelis, 1994; Crombez 1996 Crombez , 1997 Crombez , 2000 . Spatial models have also been applied to the CAP to study how the institutional setting increases or depresses the likelihood of reform (de Gorter et al., 1998; Pokrivcak et al. 2001; Henning and Latacz-Lohmann, 2004; Pokrivcak et al. 2006 ).
Spatial models are particularly effective in reproducing the conditions that a procedure imposes for the adoption of a specific policy. Moreover, they make it possible to evaluate the room for policy reform the procedure allows, and provide valuable insights in the powers of the actors involved in the procedure. Furthermore, the different models" results are easily comparable.
To evaluate the implications of the adoption of co-decision for the CAP we apply two spatial models proposed by Crombez (1996 Crombez ( , 2000 to the CAP. More specifically, we highlight the changes imposed by the new procedure in terms of the room for policy reform and the institutions" powers. We evaluate the impact of co-decision on CAP decision-making by focusing on policy scenarios that are suitable for the CAP.
This paper is organized as follows. In section two we discuss the main differences between consultation and co-decision focusing on the effects of the procedures on the formal roles of the institutions. In section three we present the main results of the spatial models for consultation and co-decision, and apply them to the CAP. Section four discusses the implications of the introduction of co-decision for CAP reform. We conclude with some final remarks in section five.
The Consultation and Co-decision Procedures
Before the Treaty of Lisbon, the CAP"s legislative procedure was the "consultation"
procedure. Consultation starts with a legislative proposal presented by the Commission. The
Commission submits the proposal to the EP and the Economic and Social Committee (ESC).
Those bodies have a consultative role. The ESC expresses its opinion over the proposed legislation, whereas the EP can propose amendments. The EP amendments are evaluated by the Commission which may or may not include them in its proposal.
The proposal is then submitted to the Council. For the evaluation of the proposal the The sequence of events under consultation can then be represented as in Figure 1 .
First, the Commission proposes a policy. Next, the MSs can propose amendments. We assume for simplicity that only one MS k is selected to propose an amendment, and that it can decide whether or not to use that opportunity. If it does propose an amendment, the amendment subsequently needs unanimity in the Council for adoption. Finally, the MSs can approve the (amended) proposal by qualified majority. If it is approved, it becomes EU law.
Otherwise the status quo prevails.
--- Figure 1 about here --- In sum, under co-decision the Commission formulates proposals that need the support of the EP and a qualified majority in the Council for adoption. Moreover, the EP and a qualified majority can together amend proposals in the Conciliation Committee.
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Figure 2 summarizes the sequence of events under co-decision. First, the Commission formulates a proposal. Next, the EP gets to vote on the proposal, and then the MSs vote on it (by qualified majority). These two steps are considered as the first reading. The second reading is analytically irrelevant, because it is similar to the first. For that reason it is not represented in Figure 2 . Subsequently, the Conciliation Committee meets and negotiates a joint text. For simplicity we assume that the EP proposes the joint text. 5 In reality the MSs could also be formulating it, and there may be different rounds of proposals and amendments, but the results would not be significantly different. Finally, the MSs vote on the joint text. The joint text becomes EU policy if it is approved by a qualified majority. Otherwise the status quo prevails.
--- Figure 2 about here ---Hence, compared to the consultation procedure, the co-decision procedure enhances the EP"s role in two important ways. First, it gives the EP a veto right on legislation. At no stage in the process can a proposal be adopted without the consent of the EP. Second, the EP and the Council can together amend Commission proposals. In contrast to the EP, with the shift to the co-decision procedure, the Commission lost much of its formal influence over the legislative process, especially in the Conciliation Committee.
The Model
We now develop a formal spatial model of CAP decision making under consultation and co- The sequence of events in CAP decision making was discussed in the previous section and depends on the legislative procedure that applies. In our analysis, we assume complete and perfect information. The actors, i.e., the MSs, the EP and the Commission know each other's preferences, the location of the status quo q, the impact of proposed policies, the sequential structure of the models, and the actions taken in prior stages of the models.
An equilibrium consists of a strategy for each actor. Strategies tell the actors what actions to choose in the relevant stages of the procedure, given the actions taken in prior stages. The equilibrium concept is subgame perfect Nash. In a Nash equilibrium, no actor can achieve a higher utility by choosing another strategy, given the other actors" strategies. In a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, actors can do no better than stick to their strategies in any stage of the procedure, even if an actor deviated from the equilibrium strategy in a prior stage.
The outcomes of the models are the policies that are adopted under the different procedures, given the preferences of the players and the location of the status quo. For the purposes of our analysis we will focus on the main results of the models in terms of the potential for policy reform and the actors" powers. In the next subsections we first present the results for the consultation procedure, and then discuss co-decision.
Consultation
In the last stage of the consultation procedure the MSs thus vote on the proposal. The proposal needs qualified majority support to be adopted. If the status quo is to the right of MS b, as in Figure 3 , MS b is pivotal. The set of proposals that can be adopted in the last stage, the "qualified majority set", is then the set [2p b -q,q] of policies which MS b prefers to the status quo. In Figure 3 the Commission, MSs 1, a and b, and the EP are all to the left of the status quo. They all want lower agricultural subsidies, for example. The MS n wants higher subsidies, however.
--- Figure 3 about here ---Not all the proposals in the qualified majority set necessarily make it through the second and third stages of consultation, however. Amendments can be approved if all MSs prefer a policy to the left (right) of the proposal. For a proposal in the qualified majority set to get through the second and third stages of consultation it thus also needs to be in the "amendment set" [p 1 ,p n ], between the ideal policies of the two most extreme MSs. In Figure 3 all policies that are in the qualified majority set are also in the amendment set.
Under consultation the Commission proposal thus has to fulfill two requirements for adoption. First, it needs to be in the set of policies that are preferred to the status quo by a qualified majority. Second, it has to be located between the ideal policies of the two extreme In equilibrium the Commission successfully proposes the policy CS EU p that satisfies the two requirements mentioned above and is closest to its preferences. In Figure 3 this is its ideal policy. Its ideal policy is in the "consultation set", the intersection of the qualified majority and amendment sets, and can thus be adopted under consultation. The result is summarized in Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1 Under consultation the Commission successfully proposes the policy it prefers most from among the policies that are preferred to the status quo by a qualified majority in the Council and are located between the ideal policies of the two extreme MSs.

Proof: See Appendix
Co-decision
In the last stage of the co-decision procedure the MSs vote on the joint text, as shown in Figure 2 . The joint text needs qualified majority support to be adopted. If MS b is to the left of the status quo, as in Figure 3 , the set of joint texts that can be adopted in the last stage is the set [2p b -q,q] of policies MS b prefers to the status quo, the qualified majority set.
In the penultimate stage the EP proposes a joint text. It proposes the policy it prefers most from among the policies that are preferred to the status quo by a qualified majority. In Figure 3 the EP successfully proposes its own ideal policy.
When the EP and MSs vote on the Commission proposal in stages two and three of codecision, they look ahead and compare the proposal to the joint text the EP will formulate in the next stage. The proposal is approved if the EP and a qualified majority in the Council vote in favor. They vote in favor, if they prefer the proposal to the joint text. This implies that they prefer it to the status quo, because the joint text is preferred to the status quo. However, there is no policy that the EP likes better than the joint text from among the policies a qualified majority prefers to the status quo. As a result the Commission cannot formulate a proposal that is different from the joint text and is preferred to it by the EP and a qualified majority.
Thus the Commission can do no better than propose the joint text. Formally this is equivalent to saying that it has no impact on policy under co-decision. In equilibrium the joint text then becomes EU policy CD EU p under co-decision.
In reality MSs may be proposing the joint text, and the EP and the MSs may amend proposed joint texts. Therefore the joint text that is adopted is not necessarily the policy the EP prefers most from among the policies a qualified majority prefers to the status quo. It may be the policy a MS prefers most from among the policies the EP and a qualified majority prefer to the status quo. The set of policies the EP prefers to the status quo is referred to as the "EP set". In Figure 3 it is a subset of the qualified majority set.
In any case the joint text that is adopted, is preferred to the status quo by the EP and a qualified majority. Hence it is in both the qualified majority and EP sets. Moreover, no policy is preferred to it by the EP and a qualified majority. That is, it is in the "joint text set", the set of policies that are located between the ideal policies of the EP and the MSs that are pivotal under qualified majority rule. If the joint text were not in the qualified majority and EP sets, it would not be approved. If it were not in the joint text set, an amendment would be proposed and approved. Agricultural subsidies, for example, can only be lowered as far as the EP and the pivotal MS are willing to accept. Furthermore, they cannot be reduced further than the EP and the pivotal MS want ideally.
In Figure 3 the joint text set is the set [p a ,p p ]. No policy is preferred to the policies in this set by the EP and a qualified majority. The EP (weakly) prefers policies to the right of the set, but there is no qualified majority for such a move. The joint text is in this set even if the EP does not propose it. If the EP does get to formulate the joint text, it can obtain its ideal policy. Its ideal policy is in the "co-decision set", the intersection of the qualified majority, EP
and joint text sets.
The precise location of the joint text within the joint text set depends on the bargaining powers of the institutions in the Conciliation Committee. To the extent that the Commission has bargaining powers in the Conciliation Committee, even though it has no voting rights in the Committee, it can also affect EU policy, within the joint text set. This could occur, for example, in an incomplete information world in which the Commission has private information.
The result is summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Under co-decision the equilibrium EU policy is preferred to the status quo by the EP and a qualified majority in the Council and is located between the ideal policies of the EP and the MSs that are pivotal under qualified majority rule. The exact location of the equilibrium policy depends on the relative bargaining powers in the
Conciliation Committee. Figure 5 shows how the equilibrium policy under co-decision varies as a function of the location of the status quo for the same configuration of ideal policies as in Figure 4 . The function is represented by the bold lines.
Proof: See Appendix
--- Figure 5 about here ---Gridlock is an important feature of decision making under co-decision, as it was under consultation. In the context of our model gridlock refers to the status quo being maintained, whereas reform means a change away from the status quo. In intervals III and IV in Figure 5 , , the status quo is maintained. In interval III the status quo is located between the preferred policies of the two pivotal MSs under qualified majority rule. As a result the Council cannot agree on the direction of change, and the status quo prevails in internal III. In interval IV the EP does not agree with a qualified majority on the direction of change: MS b and a qualified majority want a move to the left, but the EP wants a move to the right. The status quo thus prevails in interval IV as well.
In the other intervals the EP and a qualified majority do agree on the direction of change. If the status quo is located at the extremes, as in intervals I and V, the EP can successfully propose its ideal policy EP p . In interval I the status quo is far enough to the left for MS a to prefer the EP"s ideal policy to the status quo. In interval V the status quo is to the right of the EP"s ideal policy, and MS b"s ideal policy is to the left of the EP"s ideal policy.
The EP will thus propose its ideal policy, and MS b and a qualified majority will vote in favor. Gridlock is rather important and, not surprisingly, involves situations in which the EP cannot agree on the direction of change with a qualified majority, or a qualified majority cannot agree within the Council.
In intermediate locations, in interval II, MS
Implications for CAP Reform
We now combine the previous insights to derive implications of the introduction of co-decision for the CAP reform. In particular we study the effects on the extent of gridlock, the location of EU policy, and the institutions" powers. Furthermore, we discuss how these effects depend on the preferences of the EP.
Under both legislative procedures there is gridlock if no qualified majority agrees on the direction of policy change. If there is no qualified majority in the Council in favor of CAP reform, it does not occur, whether it be under consultation or co-decision. The introduction of co-decision does not alter that.
However, there are differences as a result of the different powers the institutions have under the two procedures. Under consultation there is gridlock if the Commission does not agree with a qualified majority. This type of gridlock does not occur under co-decision.
Instead, co-decision leads to gridlock if the EP does not agree with a qualified majority.
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Whether there is more gridlock, and thus less CAP reform, under co-decision than under consultation then depends on the locations of the ideal policies of the Commission and EP relative to the ideal policies of the pivotal MSs.
First, suppose the EP and the Commission are both located between the pivotal MSs.
Then the "gridlock interval", i.e. the set of status quos that cannot be changed, is the same under both procedures. It is the set [p a ,p b ] of policies between the ideal policies of the two pivotal MSs. There is gridlock, and thus no room for CAP reform, if no qualified majority agrees.
Second, suppose the EP (Commission) is located between the pivotal MSs, but the Commission (EP) is not. Then the gridlock interval is smaller under co-decision (consultation). In some instances the Commission (EP) does not agree with a qualified majority, which leads to more gridlock under consultation (co-decision). Under co-decision We now study how the location of the EP affects the prospects for CAP reform.
Suppose that the pivotal MSs and the Commission all want to move to the left and that the Commission wants to move farther than the pivotal MSs, as was the case in the previous figures. The EP then blocks CAP reform if it wants to move in the opposite direction away from the status quo, say, if it wants an increase in subsidies rather than a reduction. Assume for simplicity that the EP has all the bargaining powers in the Conciliation Committee. Then the EP obtains its ideal policy if it wants to move in the same direction as a qualified majority and does not want to move farther than the pivotal MS is willing to accept. If it wants to move farther, it obtains the policy that makes the pivotal MS indifferent to the status quo.
These results are illustrated in Figure The introduction of co-decision reduces the prospects for CAP reform if the EP wants less reform than does the Commission. The extent of reform also depends on the bargaining powers in the Conciliation Committee, however. Whether co-decision leads to more or less reform than consultation thus hinges on who has bargaining powers in the Conciliation Committee. If the Commission is more pro-reform than are the EP and the MSs with bargaining powers, the use of co-decision reduces the extent of CAP reform.
Conclusions
In this study we used spatial models of EU decision making to examine the effects of  Suppose the proposal and the amendment would both be adopted in stage four. In stage three a MS then votes in favor of the amendment am if it is closer to the MS"s ideal policy than is the proposal. The amendment is thus approved in stage three, if it is closer to all MSs" ideal policies than is the proposal.
 Suppose the proposal would not be adopted in stage four, but the amendment would. In stage three a MS then votes in favor of the amendment if it is closer to the MS"s ideal policy than is the status quo. The amendment is thus approved in stage three, if it is closer to all MSs" ideal policies than is the status quo.
 Suppose the amendment would not be adopted in stage four. Then the MSs can do no better than vote against it in stage three. Thus, such an amendment is not approved in stage three. o Stage four.
 The EP proposes as a joint text the policy it prefers most from among the policies that are preferred to the status quo by a qualified majority, the policies that are in the qualified majority set.
o Stages three and two.
 The EP and the MSs vote in favor of the Commission proposal if they prefer it to the joint text. The proposal is adopted if the EP and a qualified majority prefer it to the joint text.
 A proposal that is preferred by a qualified majority to the joint text, which is preferred to the status quo by a qualified majority, is also preferred to the status quo by a qualified majority.
 Therefore, there is no proposal preferred to the joint text by the EP and a qualified majority, except the joint text itself. If there were such a proposal, the EP would propose it as a joint text.
o Stage one.
 As a result the Commission can do no better than to propose the joint text. This proposal is adopted and becomes the EU policy CD EU p under co-decision. MS k may propose an amendment.
The MSs vote on the (amended) proposal (by qualified majority).
The Commission formulates a proposal.
The MSs vote on the amendment (by unanimity).
The EP proposes a joint text.
The MSs vote on the proposal (by qualified majority).
The EP votes on the proposal.
The MSs vote on the joint text (by qualified majority). 
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